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GIVE THEM $4.96 AND THEY TAKE $200 MILLION: WHY
BROWN V. LEGAL FOUNDATION OF WASHINGTON VIOLATES
THE FIFTH AMENDMENT
INTRODUCTION

The purpose of the Interest on Lawyers' Trust Accounts ("IOLTA")
program is to fund organizations that provide legal services to the indigent with the interest earned from the principal held in attorneys' trust
accounts.' The program is approved in every state and the District of
Columbia,2 but has been the target of Fifth Amendment challenges since
its inception.
In Brown v. Legal Foundation of Washington,4 the United States
Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether a state's appropriation of
interest generated by IOLTA accounts amounts to a taking of private
property, and, if so, the measure of just compensation due the claimants.5
The Brown Court held that Washington's IOLTA program, which diverted interest earned on IOLTA accounts to charity, could result in a per
se taking. 6 However, the Court also held that the just compensation due
the claimants was zero,7 despite previous rulings predicting a contrary
result.
This Comment discusses the Fifth Amendment issues raised by the
IOLTA program and demonstrates the constitutional problems inherent
in the Brown Court's ruling. Part I explains the facts giving rise to the
issues addressed in Brown. Part II provides the background of IOLTA
programs and the significant cases leading to the Brown decision. Part III
summarizes the majority and dissenting opinions in Brown. Part IV critiques the Brown majority's decision as a matter of precedent, and evaluates the majority's decision that just compensation in IOLTA cases is
zero. Part IV concludes that the Brown decision is incongruous with the
Fifth Amendment and offers constitutional alternatives to the IOLTA
program's administration that will serve the dual purpose of maintaining
the social benefits of the program without undermining the Constitution.

I.

Erin E. Heuer Lantzer, IOLTA Lost the Battle but Has Not Lost the War, 33 IND. L. REV.

1015, 1015 (2000).
Id. at 1018.
2.

3.
4.
5.
6.

Id. at 1015.
538 U.S. 216 (2003).
Brown, 538 U.S. at 220.
Id. at 240.

7.

See id.
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I. FACTS

Petitioners Brown and Hayes were regularly involved in the purchase and sale of real estate in the State of Washington.8 Both deposited
funds in connection with their transactions with Limited Practice Officers ("LPOs"). 9 Pursuant to Washington's IOLTA rules, the LPOs were
required to deposit each client's funds into IOLTA accounts. 0
Petitioner Brown deposited $90,521.29 of escrow funds into an
IOLTA account, where it remained for two days and generated $4.96 in
interest." Petitioner Hayes deposited $2,000 in earnest money, plus another $12,793.32 of escrow funds, into an IOLTA account.' 2 While neither petitioner would have earned any net interest if his funds were
placed in non-IOLTA escrow accounts, 13 in both cases, each IOLTA
account generated interest that was eventually paid to the Legal Foundation of Washington. "4
II. BACKGROUND
The Legal Foundation of Washington's stated objective is to "use
all funds received from lawyers' trust accounts for tax-exempt lawrelated charitable and educational purposes . .

."'15 Washington's ap-

proach, by its terms, envelops a broad spectrum of recipient organizations and demonstrates that the IOLTA program's function is not neces-6
sarily limited to funding groups that provide legal aid for the indigent.'
Like Washington, other states' uses of IOLTA funds also include educating school children about our legal system, supporting
legal clinics run
7
by law students, and litigating gay rights issues.'
The impact of the IOLTA program on these objectives is substantial. The Supreme Court noted in Brown that the sum of IOLTA contributions surpassed $200 million in 2001.18 Those contributions help organizations furnish legal services to approximately 1.7 million people
annually.' 9 Following is a brief history of the IOLTA program's devel8.
See Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216, 228 (2003).
9. See Brown, 538 U.S. at 229. In Washington, IOLTA Rules also extend beyond lawyers to
Limited Practice Officers ("LPOs"). Id. at 227. LPOs "are licensed to act as escrowees in the closing
of real estate transactions." Id. LPOs, like lawyers, typically control client funds for short periods of
time. Id.
10. See id.
11. Id. at 229.
12. Id.
13.
Id.at 230.
14.

See id.

15. Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216, 225 (2003) (quoting IOLTA Adoption
Order, 102 Wash. 2d 1101, 1102-04 (1984)).
16. See Lantzer, supra note I, at 1019-20.
17.

Id.

18.

Brown, 538 U.S. at 223.

19.

Jarrod P. Beasley, Interest on Lawyers' Trust Accounts: A FifthAmendment Analysis:

Phillips v. Washington Legal Foundation, 524 U.S. 156 (1998), 25 S. ILL. U. L.J. 441,441 (2001).
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opment and the basis of its application to the Fifth Amendment Takings
Clause.
A. HistoricalDevelopment of the IOLTA Program
Lawyers commonly maintain client funds in trust accounts for short
time periods in order to facilitate settlements and to finance filing fees
20
and real property transaction costs. Professional ethical standards prohibit lawyers from commingling these client funds with their own and
2
mandate that client funds remain available on demand. '
Before 1980, federal banking laws prohibited banks from paying interest on demand deposit accounts, which included most attorneys' trust
22
accounts, because of the inherent need for check-writing capabilities.
Attorneys would normally pool client funds held in trust in a single, noninterest bearing checking account.23 When an attorney retained a large
amount in trust for a client, he would typically place the funds in a savings account paying interest because the interest earned outweighed the
24
burden posed by the incapability of writing checks.
Changes in federal banking laws in 1980 made the IOLTA program
possible when Congress sanctioned Negotiable Order of Withdrawal
("NOW") accounts which, for the first time, allowed banks to pay interest on the demand deposit accounts of individuals and charitable enti25
and partner26
However, the new law still prohibited corporations
ties.
ships from earning interest on demand deposit accounts.
The effect of this distinction was that lawyers were able to place
funds in interest-bearing demand deposit accounts for clients who were
either individuals or charitable entities, but clients who were corporations
27
or partnerships were still not entitled to earn interest on their funds.
Therefore, despite Congress's authorization of NOW accounts, lawyers
still maintained client funds incapable of earning interest in non-interest
bearing accounts when the client was a corporation or partnership, or
when an individual client's funds were too small or would not be held
28
long enough to generate interest exceeding the bank's fees.

20.

J. David Breemer, IOLTA in the New Millennium: Slowly Sinking Under the Weight of the

Takings Clause, 23 U. HAW. L. REV. 221, 223 (2000).
See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.15(a) (2002) ("A lawyer shall
21.
hold property of clients or third persons that is in a lawyer's possession in connection with a representation separate from the lawyer's own property. Funds shall be kept in a separate account maintained in the state where the lawyer's office is situated, or elsewhere with the consent of the client or
third person." (emphasis added)).
22. See Beasley, supra note 19, at 442.
23. Phillips v. Washington Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 160 (1998).
24. Phillips, 524 U.S. at 160-61.
25. See 12 U.S.C. § 1832 (2000); see also Beasley, supra note 19, at 442.
Beasley, supra note 19, at 443.
26.
27. See id. at 442-43.
Id. at 443.
28.

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 8 1:1

After Congress sanctioned NOW accounts, every state and the District of Columbia subsequently adopted proposals that either required or
allowed attorneys to pool these otherwise stagnant funds in a common
trust account which would generate interest to be funneled to non-profit
entities providing legal aid to the indigent. 29 These proposals would soon
be known collectively as the IOLTA program.
B. The Fifth Amendment Takings Clause
The IOLTA program has spawned several challenges based on the
Fifth Amendment Takings Clause. 3 The Takings
Clause, , applicable to
31
the states through the Fourteenth Amendment,3 states that "private property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just compensation. The
Clause's language contains four basic elements: (1) there must be private
property; (2) the government action must take the private property; (3)
the government action must take the private property for public use; and
(4) if the preceding three elements are satisfied, the former owner's remedy is "just compensation., 33 In other words, the Takings Clause permits
the government to take private property for public use, subject to the
payment of just compensation.
1. Phillips v. Washington Legal Foundation
The threshold question in a Takings Clause challenge to the IOLTA
program is whether or not there is "a loss in connection with some cognizable property interest. 35 The Supreme Court answered this question
affirmatively in Phillips v. Washington Legal Foundation,36 which involved the Texas IOLTA program. 37 The Court explained that "regardless of whether the owner of the principal [in an IOLTA account] has a
constitutionally cognizable interest in the anticipatedgeneration of interest by his funds, any interest that does accrue attaches as a property right
incident to the ownership of the underlying principal., 38 Accordingly, the
Court held "that the interest income generated by funds held in IOLTA
29. See Brown, 538 U.S. at 221 (explaining that state IOLTA programs were adopted through
either legislation or rules promulgated by the state's highest court); see als6 Beasley, supra note 19,
at 443.
30. Kristi L. Darnell, Pennies From Heaven-Why Washington Legal Foundation v. Legal
Foundation of Washington Violates the U.S. Constitution, 77 WASH. L. REV. 775, 780-81 (2002).
31.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I. The Fourteenth Amendment provides, "nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ..."Id.
32.
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
33.

See generally JAN G. LAITOs, LAW OF PROPERTY RIGHTS PROTECTION IV- I to IV-6

(Supps. 2002 & 2003).
34.
Darnell, supra note 30, at 281.
35. Beasley, supra note 19, at 456.
36. 524 U.S. 156 (1998). The Court framed the question presented as "whether interest earned
on client funds held in IOLTA accounts is 'private property' of either the client or the attorney for
purposes of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment." Phillips, 524 U.S. at 160.
37. Id. at 161.
38. Id. at 168.
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39
accounts is the 'private property' of the owner of the principal., However, the only issue decided in Phillips was whether or not interest
earned on IOLTA accounts is a property interest recognized by the Fifth
Amendment.40 The Court did not reach the issues of whether the IOLTA
program causes a taking, and, if so, the "amount of 'just compensation,'
if any, due ....

2. Ad Hoc v. Per Se Analysis
Takings Clause jurisprudence has developed two categories of takings analysis-ad hoc and per se.42 In determining whether a taking of
action in question is
private property has occurred, the governmental
43
categories.
two
these
analyzed under one of
44
Ad hoc takings, also referred to as "regulatory takings," involve
regulations that strip property owners of an interest less than the property's total value.4 5 The focus of an ad hoc analysis is to establish
whether a regulation goes so far in denying an owner an interest in her
property to constitute a taking. 6

To determine whether an ad hoc taking occurs, courts apply a balancing test using factors established by the Supreme Court in Penn Central TransportationCo. v. New York City.47 These factors include: (1) the
regulation's economic impact on the property owner; (2) the degree of
the regulation's interference with the owner's investment-backed expec48
tations; and (3) "the character of the governmental action,.
In contrast, per se takings, also referred to as "physical takings," are
characterized by a "permanent, physical occupation of the property or
where the government has deprived the claimant of all of the property's
economic or productive use.",49 The framework of a per se analysis was
established by the Supreme Court in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan
CATV Corp.50 In Loretto, a regulation required an apartment building
owner to permit the installation of cable television equipment in the
building. 5' The Court concluded that the cable company's installation of
equipment was a permanent physical occupation of the owner's property, 52 and "that a permanent physical occupation authorized by govern39.

Id. at 172.

40.
41.

See id.
Id.

42.
43.

Darnell, supra note 30, at 786.
Id.

44.

See id. at 788.

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Id. at 786.
See id. at 787.
438 U.S. 104 (1978).
Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
Lantzer, supra note I,at 1028.
458 U.S. 419 (1982); see also Darnell, supra note 30, at 788.
See Loretto, 458 U.S. at 42 1.
Id. at 438.
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ment is a taking without regard to the public interests that it may
serve." 53 Since a per se, or automatic, taking resulted from the physical
occupation by the cable equipment, the need to employ the Penn Central
balancing test was averted.54
Before Brown, the existence of these two competing analytical
frameworks and the narrow holding in Phillips provided an uncertain
environment for the Takings Clause's application to the IOLTA program.55 Though Phillips unequivocally established that IOLTA interest is
the private property of the owner of the principal, the circuit courts were
split as to whether IOLTA programs were a taking and, if so, whether
clients were due just compensation. 56 In short, although the Phillipsholding seemingly delivered a blow to IOLTA programs,5 7 the stage was set
for the Supreme Court's determination of whether IOLTA constituted an
ad hoc or per se taking of that property interest and, if so, the amount of
just compensation due the claimants.
III.

BROWN V. LEGAL FOUNDATION OF WASHINGTON

Brown v. Legal Foundation of Washington 58 focused on the claims
arising from the IOLTA accounts of petitioners Brown and Hayes. 59 Petitioners sought to enjoin Washington officials from requiring LPOs to
deposit client trust funds into IOLTA accounts. 6° Defendants were the
Legal Foundation of Washington, the Foundation president, and the
Washington Supreme Court justices.6'
A. Procedural History
The petitioners' complaint contained three counts: (1) forcing petitioners to associate with the Legal Foundation of Washington violates
their First Amendment rights; (2) the taking of the interest earned by
their funds while in the IOLTA accounts violates the Fifth Amendment's
Just Compensation Clause; and (3) the requirement that petitioners' trust
funds be deposited into IOLTA accounts is "an illegal taking of the beneficial use of those funds. 6 2 Petitioners sought a refund of the interest
their principal earned while the funds were in the IOLTA accounts, a

53. Id. at 426.
54. See Damell, supra note 30,at 788-89.
55.
See id. at 785-86.
56.
See id. (illustrating the circuit split by describing the Fifth Circuit's use of the per se
analysis in Washington Legal Found. v. Texas Equal Access to Justice Found., 270 F.3d 180, 186-88
(5th Cir. 2001), and the Ninth Circuit's adoption of the ad hoc analysis in Washington Legal Found.
v. Legal Found. of Wash., 271 F.3d 835, 857-61 (9th Cir. 2001)).
57.
Lantzer, supra note 1,at 1027.
58.
538 U.S. 216 (2003).
59. Brown, 538 U.S. at 228.
60. Id. at 227-28.
61. Id.at 228.
62. Id. at 228-29.
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declaration that the IOLTA program is unconstitutional, and an injunc63
tion against enforcement of the IOLTA rules against LPOs.
The defendants' motion for summary judgment was granted by the
district court. 64 The court made the factual finding that it was impossible
for petitioners to realize a net return on the interest accrued in their
IOLTA accounts because if their funds were capable of generating a net
return in non-IOLTA accounts in the first place, the LPOs would not
65
have been required to deposit the funds into an IOLTA account. The
court made the further legal finding that the constitutional focus is on
what a property owner has lost, rather than what the state has gained, and
determined that petitioners lost nothing when the state took their interest
from the IOLTA account because, without IOLTA, there would have
been no net interest earned.66

While Brown was on appeal, the Supreme Court decided Phillips v.
Washington Legal Foundation,67 which held that the owner of the principal has a cognizable property right in any interest that accrues in an
IOLTA account. 68 A three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit relied on
Phillips in holding that Washington's IOLTA program resulted in a taking of petitioners' property and that a remand was necessary to resolve
69
whether the petitioners were due just compensation. The panel explained:
[T]he interest generated by IOLTA pooled trust accounts is property
of the clients and customers whose money is deposited into trust, and
...a government appropriation of that interest for public purposes is
a taking entitling them to just compensation under the Fifth Amendment. But just compensation for the takings may be less than the
on the circumamount of the interest taken, or nothing, depending 70
remand.
a
requires
remedy
the
stances, so determining
Subsequently, the Ninth Circuit reconsidered the case en banc and
affirmed the district court's judgment. 71 The majority adopted the ad hoc
72
balancing test,
approach and, after application of the Penn Central
found that no taking occurred because petitioners incurred "neither an

63. Id. at 229.
Id. at 230.
64.
65. See id.
66. See id.
524 U.S. 156 (1998); see also discussion supra Part l.B. 1.
67.
See Phillips, 524 U.S. at 168.
68.
Washington Legal Found. v. Legal Found. of Wash., 236 F.3d 1097, 1115 (9th Cir. 2001).
69.
Washington Legal Found., 236 F.3d at 1115.
70.
Washington Legal Found. v. Legal Found. of Wash., 271 F.3d 835, 841 (9th Cir. 2001)
71.
(en banc).
See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
72.
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actual loss nor an interference with any investment-backed expectations,
and that the regulation of the use of their property was permissible. 73
The Ninth Circuit majority also commented that even if a taking did
occur, the just compensation due petitioners was zero.74 The majority
reasoned that to establish whether petitioners were entitled to just compensation, the court must determine whether petitioners would have realized a benefit without the IOLTA program.7 5 Since petitioners earned
interest only because of the IOLTA program's existence, they would not
have realized a benefit without the IOLTA program, and the value of the
just compensation was therefore nil.76
The Ninth Circuit dissenters adopted in full the opinion of the threejudge panel and asserted that the case did not involve a regulatory taking
necessitating reliance on Penn Central, but rather involved a per se taking. 77 Additionally, the dissenters reiterated the view that a remand was
needed to determine whether or not the petitioners were entitled to any
compensation for the taking.' 8 As Judge Kozinski explained: "If the state
believes that this is a service it should provide, it must be willing to pay
for it. There ain't no such thing as a free lunch. 7 9
In their petition for certiorari, petitioners Brown and Hayes asked
the Supreme Court "to resolve the disagreement between the majority
and the dissenters in the Ninth Circuit about the taking issue ....
"80
B. The Majority Opinion
Justice Stevens, joined by Justices O'Connor, Souter, Ginsburg, and
Breyer, delivered the majority opinion. 8 1 The Court found that the
IOLTA program caused a per se taking of petitioners' private property
for a public use. 82 However, the Court found no violation of the Just
Compensation Clause when petitioners were not remunerated for the
taken interest because, the majority reasoned, just compensation is measured by a property owner's pecuniary loss, and that loss is zero when the
Washington IOLTA rules are followed.83
The Court began its analysis by finding that the IOLTA program
took the petitioners' interest for public use under the Fifth Amendment

73.

Brown, 538 U.S. at 231.

74.

Washington Legal Found., 271 F.3d at 861-62.

75.
Id. at 862.
76. See id. at 863-64.
77. See id. at 865-67 (Kozinski, J.,
dissenting).
78. Id. at 880 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). The dissenters reproduced the original panel decision
in full. See id. at 867-84 (Kozinski, J.,
dissenting).
79. Id. at 867 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
80. Brown, 538 U.S. at 231.
81.
Id. at 218.
82. See id. at 235.
83. Id. at 240.
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Takings Clause.84 The Court analogized the IOLTA program to a state's
imposition of a tax used to finance the Foundation's legal services, where
"there would be no question as to the legitimacy of the use of the public's money.""
The Court concluded next that the IOLTA program's appropriation
of interest is a per se taking. 86 The Court explained that "a per se approach is more consistent with the reasoning in our Phillips opinion than
Penn Central's ad hoc analysis. As was made clear in Phillips,the interest earned in the IOLTA accounts 'is the 'private property' of the owner
of the principal."' 8 7 In support of their finding of a per se taking, the
Court drew a parallel between the taking of a client's IOLTA interest and
88
the cable equipment's occupation of roof space in Loretto. The Court
reasoned that the government's permanent physical possession of the
IOLTA interest at the time of transfer to the Foundation resembled the
cable equipment's permanent physical occupation of the Loretto rooftop
since, in both cases, the government action resulted in the state's com89
plete control over the private property involved. Accordingly, since the
interest is private property, the Court determined that its transfer to the
Foundation was in line with those takings cases applying a per se, rather
than an ad hoc, analysis. 90
After finding that a per se taking had occurred, the Court turned to
the issue of the amount of just compensation to which petitioners were
entitled and found that the just compensation for interest taken by the
IOLTA program is zero.9' The Court explained that "the 'just compensation' required by the Fifth Amendment is measured by the property
The Court then surowner's loss rather than the government's gain.
veyed precedent and restated this premise in the following ways: (1)
"'the question is what has the owner lost, not what has the taker
gained;' 93 (2) "the private party 'is entitled to be put in as good a position pecuniarily as if his property had not been taken. He must be made
should pay
whole but is not entitled to more;' ' ' 94 and (3) "the government
95
loses.',
owner
the
what
for
but
gets
it
what
'not for

Id. at 232.
84.
85. Id.
86. See id. at 235.
87. Id. (quoting Phillips, 524 U.S. at 172).
88. Id.
89. See id.
90. See id.
Id. at 240.
91.
92. Id. at 235-36.
93. Id. at 236 (quoting Boston Chamber of Commerce v. City of Boston, 217 U.S. 189, 195
(1910)).
Id. (quoting Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255 (1934)).
94.
Id. (quoting Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. I, 23 (1949) (Douglas, J.,
95.
dissenting)).
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Applying the petitioners' claims to this model, the Court found that
"any pecuniary compensation must be measured by [petitioners'] net
losses rather than the value of the public's gain.,, 96 Thus, the Court determined that if the "petitioners' net loss was zero, the compensation that
is due is also zero. 97
The Court then addressed the Ninth Circuit dissenters' illustration
of the reasons why an attorney or LPO might mistakenly place a client's
funds into an IOLTA account when those funds would actually be capable of earning net interest into a non-IOLTA account, and dismissed the
resulting need for a remand to determine the amount of just compensation due. 98 The Court rejected the dissenters' assertion that further hearings were necessary to determine whether or not petitioners were due any
just compensation from respondents.99 Since Washington's IOLTA rules
require attorneys and LPOs to place client funds into non-IOLTA accounts when those funds are capable of generating net earnings, an attorney or LPO violates those rules when she mistakenly deposits ineligible
funds into an IOLTA account.1°° The Court explained that clients, in
those circumstances, would have claims directly against the attorney or
LPO who mistakenly placed the funds into an IOLTA account, rather
than against the state.''
In sum, the majority held that a state law mandating the transfer of
interest on IOLTA funds to someone other than the owner of the principal, for public use, could be a per se taking requiring payment of just

96. Id. at 237.
97.
Id.
98.
Id. at 237-39. The Ninth Circuit dissenters illustrated their concern as follows:
Even though when funds are deposited into IOLTA accounts, the lawyers expect them to
earn less than it would cost to distribute the interest, that expectation can turn out to be
incorrect, as discussed above. Several hypothetical cases illustrate the complexities of the
remedies, which need further factual development on remand. Suppose $2,000 is deposited into a lawyer's trust account paying 5% and stays there for two days. It earns about
$.55, probably well under the cost of a stamp and envelope, along with clerical expenses,
needed to send the $.55 to the client. In that case, the client's financial loss from the taking, if a reasonable charge is made for the administrative expense, is nothing. The fair
market value of a right to receive $.55 by spending perhaps $5.00 to receive it would be
nothing. On the other hand, suppose, hypothetically, that the amount deposited into the
trust account is $30,000, and it stays there for 6 days. The client's loss here would be
about $29.59 if he does not get the interest, which may well exceed the reasonable
administrative expense of paying it to him out of a common fund. It is hard to see how
just compensation could be zero in this hypothetical taking, even though it would be in
the $2,000 for 2 days hypothetical taking. It may be that the difference between what a
pooled fund earns, and what the individual clients and escrow companies lose, adds up to
enough to sustain a valuable IOLTA program while not depriving any of the clients and
customers of just compensation for the takings. This is a practical question entirely undeveloped on this record. We leave it for the parties to consider during the remedial phase
of this litigation.
Washington Legal Found., 271 F.3d at 883 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
99.
Brown, 538 U.S. at 239.
100.
Id.
101.
Id.
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compensation to the client. 0 2 However, "just compensation is measured
by the net value of the interest that was actually earned by petitioners and
.. by operation of the Washington IOLTA Rules, no net interest can be
earned 3 by the money that is placed in IOLTA accounts in Washington."

1
0

C. Justice Scalia's Dissent
Justice Scalia, with whom all three remaining dissenting Justices
joined, asserted that the proper measure of just compensation for petitioners' interest generated in their IOLTA accounts is the fair market
value of the interest, which should be assessed at the point when the state
takes the interest. 1°4 Furthermore, the dissenters averred that the majority's decision contravenes the Phillips holding by "refusing to treat the
interest as the property of petitioners we held it to be ....
Rejecting the majority's analysis, Justice Scalia submitted an alternative definition of just compensation not considered by the majority:
"When a State has taken private property for a public use, the Fifth
Amendment requires compensation in the amount of the market value of
the property on the date it is appropriated."' 10 6 According to Justice
Scalia, the Supreme Court has recognized only two exceptions to applying this standard: (1) when it is too difficult to determine the market
value; and (2) when manifest injustice to the10 7owner or the public would
result from the payment of the market value.
According to Justice Scalia, the majority neither ascertained the
IOLTA interest's market value nor established that this case falls under
an exception obviating the need to determine it.'0 8 Instead, Justice Scalia

concluded, the majority merely defined just compensation as the owner's
net loss, and endorsed two incompatible theories of how that net loss
should be calculated.'09
As Justice Scalia explained, the majority's first theory of the measure of just compensation is that it "is the interest petitioners would have

Id. at 240.
102.
Id. at 238 n.10.
103.
104.
See id. at 243 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
105.
Id. at 242-43 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 243 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
106.
107.
Id. at 244 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. The majority preemptively disagreed with Justice Scalia's assertion when concluding:
108.
Justice SCALIA is mistaken in stating that we hold that just compensation is measured by
the amount of interest 'petitioners would have earned had their funds been deposited in
non-IOLTA accounts.' We hold (1) that just compensation is measured by the net value of
the interest that was actually earned by petitioners and (2) that, by operation of the Washington IOLTA Rules, no net interest can be earned by the money that is placed in IOLTA
accounts in Washington.
Id. at 238 n.10 (citations omitted).
Id. at 244 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
109.
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earned had their funds been deposited in non-lOLTA accounts.", 10 Under
the majority's theory, "just compensation is zero because, under the
[Washington] Supreme Court's Rules, the only funds placed in IOLTA
accounts are those which could not have earned net interest for the client
in a non-lOLTA savings account.""' Justice Scalia posited that this definition of just compensation is irreconcilable with Phillips,"12 which held
that "any interest that does accrue attaches as a property right incident to
the ownership of the underlying principal,"'" 3 and "[o]nce interest is
earned on petitioners' funds held in IOLTA accounts, that money is petitioners' property."' 14 Conversely, according to Justice Scalia, just compensation for the IOLTA interest must instead be assessed at the point
where the state takes the interest to support the foundation-"after the
Hence, under
interest has been generated in the pooled accounts ....
Justice Scalia's definition, the property has value when the state takes it
for the benefit of the foundation despite the fact that the interest came to
exist only because of a state-mandated IOLTA program. 116
In addition, Justice Scalia argued that the majority's competing theory of just compensation is similarly unpersuasive."17 According to the
majority's competing theory, "just compensation is measured by the net
value of the interest that was actually earned by petitioners . . ,,1 8 Justice Scalia indicated that in order to support this definition of just compensation embracing a net value concept, the majority only cites to those
cases establishing that "justcompensation consists of the value the owner
has lost rather than the value the government has gained."' ' 9 However,
110. Id.
Ill. Id. at 244-45 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 245 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
112.
113.
Phillips, 524 U.S. at 168.
114.
Brown, 538 U.S. at 245 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
115.
Id.
See id. Justice Scalia applied the majority's approach to the facts of Webb's Fabulous
116.
Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155 (1980), to illustrate that the majority's holding suggests
a nexus between the state's creation of the circumstances enabling net interest to accrue and the
state's ability to take that interest declaring just compensation as zero. See Brown, 538 U.S. at 24547 (Scalia, J., dissenting). In Webb's, a Florida statute permitted the court clerk to invest interpleader
funds in interest-bearing certificates, and the earned interest would be deemed income of the clerk's
office. Webb's, 449 U.S. at 156 n.l. The appellant deposited approximately $1.8 million with a state
court in connection with an interpleader action. Id. at 156-57. The Supreme Court held that the state
court's retention of the approximately $100,000 in interest earned from the corpus was a taking
requiring just compensation. See id. at 164. The Court endorsed the rule that "any interest on an
interpleaded and deposited fund follows the principal and is to be allocated to those who are ultimately to be the owners of that principal." Id. at 162. Justice Scalia argues that under the majority's
analysis in Brown, the just compensation for the taking in Webb's would be zero because the appellants' interpleader funds would not have been able to earn interest absent the Florida statute authorizing the court clerk to invest in interest-bearing certificates. Brown. 538 U.S. at 246 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). Moreover, in Webb's the "Court unanimously rejected the contention that a state regulatory scheme's generation of interest that would otherwise not have come into existence gave license
for the State to claim the interest for itself." Id. at 246-47 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
117.
See Brown, 538 U.S. at 248 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
118.
Id. at 238 n.10.
119.
Id. at 248 (Scalia, J., dissenting). In Brown, the value the owner loses (the interest earned
in the pooled accounts) is the same as the government's gain. See id.
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according to Justice Scalia, the Court's "cases that have distinguished the
'property owner's loss' from the 'government's gain' say nothing whatever about reducing this value to some 'net' amount."1 20 In particular,
Justice Scalia reasoned that "Phillips flatly rejected the notion that just
compensation may be reduced by transaction costs the former owner
would have sustained in retaining his property."' 2'' Thus, Justice Scalia
submitted that the Court has consistently held market value to be the
22
proper measure of just compensation, rather than the owner's net loss.
Additionally, Justice Scalia argued that "[e]ven if 'net value' . . .
were the appropriate measure of just compensation, the Court has no
basis whatsoever for pronouncing the 'net value' of petitioners' interest
to be zero."'' 23 Though Justice Scalia acknowledged that petitioners could
not have earned net interest in non-IOLTA accounts, he instead reasoned,
that fact "has no bearing on the transaction costs that petitioners would
sustain in removing their earned interest from the IOLTA accounts.' 24
Furthermore, Justice Scalia determined that since it was possible that
petitioners' funds generated net interest in the IOLTA account, despite
being incapable of doing so in non-IOLTA accounts, a factual
inquiry
25
was necessary to determine petitioners' actual net interest.
Justice Scalia further rejected the majority's finding that remanding
the claim was inappropriate since the just compensation was automatically zero if petitioners' funds were incapable of earning interest in nonIOLTA accounts. 26 Justice Scalia criticized this reasoning as inconsistent with the majority's assertion that just compensation is measured by
"'the net value of the interest that was actually earned by petitioners...
.,,,27 Instead, Justice Scalia suggested that establishing the actual net
value of petitioners' interest "requires a factual determination of the costs

120. Id. at 249 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
121.
Id. (citing Phillips, 524 U.S. at 170 ("The government may not seize rents received by the
owner of a building simply because it can prove that the costs incurred in collecting the rents exceed
the amount collected.")).
122. Id. at 250 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The majority countered Justice Scalia's contention:
Under [Justice Scalia's] view that just compensation should be measured by the gross
amount of the interest taken by the State, the client should recover the $.55 of interest
earned on a two-day deposit even when the transaction costs amount to $2.00. Thus, in
this case, under Justice SCALIA's approach, even if it is necessary to incur substantial
legal and accounting fees to determine how many pennies of interest were earned while
petitioners' funds remained in escrow and how much of that interest belonged to them
rather than to the sellers, the Constitution would require that they be paid the gross
amount of that interest, rather than an amount equal to their net loss (which, of course, is
zero).... [T]his is inconsistent with the Court's just compensation precedents.
Id. at 238 n. 10.
123.
Id. at 250 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
124.
Id.
125.
See id. at 251 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
126.
Id.
127. Id. (quoting id. at 238 n.10).
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petitioners would incur
' 28if they sought to keep the IOLTA-generated interest for themselves."'
In short, Justice Scalia criticized the majority for failing to recognize and apply the market value measure of just compensation. Further,
as a broader criticism, Justice Scalia maintained that the Brown Court's
decision and reasoning endorsed the government's unconstitutional ability to take property in existence solely by operation of a governmental
regulation without just compensation.129
D. Justice Kennedy's Dissent
Justice Kennedy filed a separate dissenting opinion, in which he addressed the First Amendment dimension of the IOLTA program:
By mandating that the interest from these accounts serve causes the
justices of the Washington Supreme Court prefer, the State not only
takes property in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
to the Constitution of the United States but also grants to itself a monopoly which might then be used for the forced support of certain
viewpoints. 130
Justice Kennedy noted that although the Court in Brown did not address the First Amendment issues inherent in the IOLTA program, there
is potential for a violation that may eventually come before the Court.' 3'
IV. ANALYSIS

The Brown majority's opinion that the transfer of interest earned in
lawyers' trust accounts amounts to a per se taking is founded in precedent and reason. However, the Court's assertion that there is no violation
of the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment because the
owner's loss is automatically zero whenever the Washington IOLTA
rules are obeyed is conversely lacking in factual and legal support, especially considering the holding in Phillips.
A. Phillips Versus Brown
The Brown majority laid the cornerstone of its opinion by quoting
the Phillips holding: "'[T]he interest income generated by funds held in
IOLTA accounts is the 'private property' of the owner of the principal."" 3 2 However, against this backdrop, the majority is unconvincing in
their attempt to reconcile their recognition that "'just compensation'
128. Id. at 251-52 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
129. See id. at 243, 252 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
130. Id. at 253 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
131.
See id. The First Amendment inquiry is beyond the scope of this Comment. For a discussion involving the First Amendment, see Lantzer, supra note 1, at 1035-42.
132. Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216, 220 (2003) (quoting Phillips v. Washington Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 172 (1998)).
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is measured by the property owner's loss rather than the government's
gain"'' 33 with its holding "that [just] compensation is measured by the
owner's pecuniary loss-which is zero whenever the Washington law is
obeyed ....
,,134
To appreciate Brown's anomaly in light of Phillips, it is helpful to
note the basic property theory upon which the Phillips majority fashioned its holding.'- 5 Phillips recognized that "property" includes "'the
group of rights which the . . . owner exercises in his dominion of the
' 36
physical thing,' such 'as the right to possess, use and dispose of it.""
Applying this concept to IOLTA interest, the Court reasoned that, while
such interest "may have no economically realizable value to its owner,
possession, control, and disposition are nonetheless valuable rights that
inhere in the property."'' 37 In other words, the Phillips Court expressly
recognized that IOLTA interest inherently confers on the client-owner
the power to possess, control, and dispose of that interest, regardless of
whether the value of that interest is economically realizable (e.g.,
whether the amount of the interest is exceeded by the bank's administrative fees). 38 The Phillips majority thereby enhanced the legal support for
the intuitive conclusion that valuable property rights are embedded in
IOLTA interest, and they are vested in the owner of the principal.
Such was the jurisprudential framework with which the Brown
Court was equipped when it confronted the questions that Phillips did
not reach-whether the IOLTA program caused a taking of petitioners'
interest, and, if so, the amount of just compensation due. 39 Brown correctly found a per se taking occurred because petitioners' IOLTA interest
(i.e., petitioners' property under Phillips) was taken by the state pursuant
to the Washington IOLTA Rules4 for public use (i.e., funding IOLTA
program recipient organizations).1 0
However, the issue presented by the amount of just compensation
due is the core of the irreconcilable discrepancy between Phillips and
Brown. Before Brown, one relying on Phillips would likely deduce that,
because the Brown petitioners owned the principal in the IOLTA accounts, they also owned the interest, and that interest had pecuniary
value. In other words, since Phillips affirmatively answered the question
of whether the owner of principal in an IOLTA account also owns the

133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Brown, 538 U.S. at 235-36.
Id. at 240.
Phillips, 524 U.S. at 170.
Id. (quoting United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378 (1945)).
Id.
Id.
Brown, 538 U.S. at 220.
Id. at 235.
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generated interest,' 4' it is reasonable, if not inescapable, to conclude that
the Brown petitioners owned that interest.
Moreover, it is equally sound to conclude that the Brown petitioners' IOLTA interest has economically realizable pecuniary value. Indeed,
one must look no further than the estimated $200 million enjoyed by
recipient organizations through 2001142 for undeniable proof that IOLTA
interest has realizable pecuniary value, regardless of whether the petitioners or Washington is its owner. As a practical matter, the Brown petitioners' interest had pecuniary value as demonstrated by the taking because, without any value, the state would not have taken the interest
earned. As such, the Just Compensation Clause's limitation on the state's
should require that the
Fifth Amendment power to take private property
1 43
state reimburse the petitioners for their interest.
The Brown majority held that just compensation for the taking of
the interest generated by the IOLTA account must be zero under Washington's IOLTA rules because "no net interest can be earned by the
money that is placed in IOLTA accounts in Washington."' 44 In so finding, the Brown majority ignored the basic premise of Phillips by refusing
to consider the interest to be the petitioners' property as already determined in Phillips.145 Assigning a value of zero to property that is admitted to have pecuniary value effectively divests the property owner of his
rights of possession, control, and disposition that inhere in the interest.
The practical effect is that the property owner never owned the interest.
A property owner who is precluded from exercising the inherent rights of
possession, control, and disposition has no more control of his own property than he does over the Brooklyn Bridge if he claimed title to it and
attempted a sale to the Brown majority. This result squarely contradicts
the holding in Phillips, which expressly recognized a client's property
right in interest generated by IOLTA accounts. 46 Thus, in refusing to
allow petitioners' claim for reimbursement, the majority impliedly cast
aside the well-reasoned and intuitive holding of Phillips.
B. The "Robin Hood Taking"
By declaring the just compensation for the taking of IOLTA interest
to be zero, the Brown majority summarily defeated petitioners' rights of
possession, control, and disposition of that interest. The sole basis of the
majority's finding was that the petitioners would have no interest without

141.

Phillips, 524 U.S. at 172.

142.

See Brown, 538 U.S. at 223.

See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[P]rivate property [shall not] be taken for public use, without
143.
just compensation.").
144. Brown, 538 U.S. at 238 n.10.
Id. at 242-43 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
145.
146. See Phillips, 524 U.S. at 172.
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the IOLTA program. 41 Justice Scalia illustratively coined this concept
the "Robin Hood Taking," stating that the majority suspended "the normal rules of the Constitution protecting private property" to sustain the
IOLTA program's "highly favored," policy-driven function of siphoning
interest from
otherwise stagnant funds to finance legal services for the
48
indigent.
The "Robin Hood Taking" concept derives from the majority's
holding "(1) that just compensation is measured by the net value of the
interest that was actually earned by petitioners and (2) that, by operation
of the Washington IOLTA Rules, no net interest can be earned by the
money that is placed in IOLTA accounts in Washington."'' 49 In other
words, since principal funds that are required to be deposited into IOLTA
accounts would not generate net interest for the owner "but for" the
IOLTA program, the owner of the principal is therefore incapable of
suffering a loss of any interest that accrues in the IOLTA account. In
short, the majority suggests that the owner of IOLTA interest should
keep quiet since he would not have any property in which to have an
interest in without the IOLTA program.
The validity of the "Robin Hood Taking" concept depends upon an
analytic link conspicuously absent from the authority leading to Brownif the government creates the mechanism by which property is created,
the government may take that property without just compensation because without that mechanism, the property would not exist. 5 ° The
statement in Brown that "no net interest can be earned by the money that
is placed in IOLTA accounts"' 5' runs afoul of the Phillips holding that
IOLTA interest is the "'private property' of the owner of the principal."' 152 The two statements are irreconcilable because Phillips establishes the existence of the property interest that Brown effectively declares non-existent. By finding that the interest, which is actually generated in IOLTA accounts, is somehow unearned when the owner of the
principal seeks to control the interest, the Brown majority turns a blind
eye to its decision in Phillips.
In sum, the notion that IOLTA interest, already recognized as "private property" in Phillips, is valueless, as found in Brown, has no rational or legal basis. 53 The Phillips holding is supported by wellestablished and reasoned tenets recognizing the property rights an owner
147.
See Brown, 538 U.S. at 238 n.10.
148.
Id. at 252 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
149.
Id. at 238 n.10.
150. See id. at 252 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("For to extend to the entire run of Compensation
Clause cases the rationale supporting today's judgment-what the government hath given, the government may freely take away-would be disastrous.").
151.
ld. at 238 n.10.
152.
Phillips, 524 U.S. at 172.
153.
See Brown, 538 U.S. at 252 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) ("The Court's judgment that petitioners
are not entitled to the market value of their confiscated property has no basis in law.").
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of principal has in the derivative interest. Moreover, the "Robin Hood
Taking" concept, concocted by the Brown majority, is proportionately
devoid of congruent support. Thus, the Brown Court's opinion is unpersuasive in its ostensible constitutional justification for denying petitioners' due just compensation.
C. The New "Net Loss" Rule
In addition to contradicting Phillips, and imposing a condition that
states can take, without just compensation, any state-granted property,
the Brown majority also established a "net loss" rule that is a "novel exception to [the] oft-repeated rule that the just compensation owed to former owners of confiscated property is the fair market value of the property taken."'' 54 First, the majority lacks any basis for imposing a "net
loss" rule in takings cases. The cases the majority cites in support of the
rule do not include the word "net" qualifying the word "loss," and the
"net loss" concept is therefore without legal support. 55 Moreover, the
majority's rationale for imposing a "net loss" standard for just compensation is flawed because, "[e]ven if 'net value' . . . were the appropriate
measure of just compensation," the majority did not make a factual inquiry into whether petitioners' interest actually represented a net value of
zero. 156
The fundamental defect in the majority's "net loss" rule is illustrated by applying it to the $4.96 in interest that petitioner Brown's principal earned while in the IOLTA account. 57 Brown, as the owner of the
interest, is entitled to just compensation of $4.96 because it represents
what he lost at the moment Washington took his interest. Brown's principal generated interest while in the IOLTA account; that interest is
Brown's private property under Phillips; the state took Brown's private
property for public use; and the measure of the loss of his property due to
the taking is $4.96. The conclusion that the $4.96 was Brown's private
property at the time of the taking is inescapable, regardless of whether
Brown would have earned the $4.96 in a separate, non-IOLTA account,
or whether the $4.96 was Brown's proportionate share of interest generated by his funds along with other clients' funds which Brown's lawyer
pooled in a common IOLTA account.
Further application of the majority's "net loss" rule to these facts
requires a factual inquiry as to whether Brown actually suffered a net
loss. If Brown's principal would generate $4.96 in interest in a nonIOLTA account charging a $5.00 maintenance fee, the net value of that
interest would be zero (and consistent with the holding in Brown) be154.

Id. at 241 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

155.

See id. at 249-50 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

156.

Id. at 250 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

157.

Id. at 229.
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cause the amount of the fee exceeds the interest. However, if pooled with
twenty clients' principal of equal time and amount in an IOLTA account,
the aggregate earned simple interest would be $99.20. The $5.00 (or
slightly more to match the complexity and nature of the pooled account)
maintenance fee associated with the single, common IOLTA account
would then spread among each depositor-$.25 per client in this example. The net loss to Brown after a taking of his interest in this hypothetical pooled IOLTA account is $4.71. However, the majority's holding58
requires the absurd finding that Brown's net loss of $4.71 equals zero.
This illustration establishes that, while it is possible to encounter IOLTA
accounts in which the client realizes either (1) no net interest or (2) substantial net interest, a court cannot be certain of which situation is implicated without first undertaking a factual inquiry.
In addition to the practical deficiency of the "net loss" rule, the majority's categorical finding that just compensation is automatically zero
when interest is taken from IOLTA accounts is also unconstitutional under either the "market value" or the "net value" version, because in either
case, the automatic rule forecloses any factual inquiry to determine the
measure of just compensation for the private property taken. The Ninth
Circuit dissenters correctly recognized the need for a factual inquiry
when they "voted to remand to the District Court for a factual determination of what the 'net value' of petitioners' interest actually is. '1 59 Although it is entirely possible that a client's due just compensation would
be zero under either rule, there are alternative conclusions. For example,
a client's $.30 in earned interest would likely be superceded by the
bank's administrative fees in either an IOLTA or non-IOLTA account,
but it is possible that a client's $6.00 in interest will exceed that client's
share of any administrative fees in a pooled IOLTA account. The majority's bright-line holding that the net value of IOLTA interest is zero as a
matter of law forecloses any possibility of conforming to the Fifth
Amendment's guarantee of just compensation.

158.
A three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit recently addressed a similar scenario in McIntyre
v. Bayer, 339 F.3d 1097 (9th Cir. 2003), in the context of a Nevada statute requiring that the interest
generated by prison inmate trust accounts be appropriated by prison authorities and spent for the
entire prison population's benefit. McIntyre, 339 F.3d at 1097. The court stated:
What is not clear on the record before us ...is whether the interest earned by [the prisoner's] principal is exceeded by his share of the costs of administering the prisoners' personal property fund. This information, however, is precisely what we need to know in order to determine whether the [prison officials have] taken [the prisoner's] interest without
just compensation.
Id. at 1101. The court then vacated the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the
respondent prison officials and remanded for further proceedings to determine whether the prisoners
are due just compensation after the taking of the interest generated in the inmate trust accounts. Id. at
1102.
159. Brown, 538 U.S. at 251 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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D. ConstitutionalSolutions
Although the Court's decision in Brown arguably violates the Fifth
Amendment by categorically denying just compensation to the owners of
"taken" interest, there are alternatives that would render the IOLTA system resistant to future constitutional assaults.' 6° Despite a turbulent history, the ingenuity underlying the IOLTA program, recognized by the
that would allow IOLTA programs
bench and bar,16 1 compels a solution
62
to continue largely unchanged.
First, notifying clients of the IOLTA program and asking them to
sign a consent form would eliminate any Fifth Amendment issue because
the state would not be taking the interest, but rather the client would be
giving the interest to the state. 63 If the client refused to participate in the
program, he could simply be responsible for any administrative costs
associated with maintaining his funds in a separate account.' 64 Under this
option, recipient organizations will continue to enjoy the benefits of the
consent of willing donors without the tinge
IOLTA interest through the 65
of a constitutional violation.
Additionally, a state could add a fee to annual bar dues. 166 Since
fees have never been the target of unconstitutional takings, but rather are
treated as payments for services, "the service performed by the additional
fee would be the fulfillment of an ethical obligation on the part of the
state's attorneys to render pro bono assistance to the state's indigent
would be financed
population."'' 67 The goals of IOLTA beneficiaries
168
vicariously through the collection of these fees.
Finally, another constitutional solution for funding IOLTA recipient
organizations is suggested in the dicta of Brown itself. In finding the
"public use" component of the Takings Clause satisfied, the majority
suggested: "If the State had imposed a special tax ...to generate the

funds to finance the legal services supported by the Foundation, there
would be no question as to the legitimacy of the use of the public's
money." 169 Justice Scalia's discussion of this statement includes his assertion that he is "unaware of any use to which state taxes cannot consti-

Darnell, supra note 30, at 806-07.
160.
161.
See, e.g., Washington Legal Found., 271 F.3d at 867 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) ("It is no
doubt true that the IOLTA program serves a salutary purpose, one worthy of our support. As a citizen and former member of the bar, I applaud the state's effort to provide legal services for the poor
and disadvantaged.").
Darnell, supra note 30, at 806.
162.
Id.
163.
164.
Id. at 806-07.
165.
Id. at 807.
166.
Id.
167.
Id.
168.
Id.
169.
Brown, 538 U.S. at 232.

2003] BROWN V. LEGAL FOUNDATION OF WASHINGTON

189

tutionally be devoted."'' 70 Accordingly, a state legislature could impose a
tax earmarked for organizations providing legal assistance and education
to the indigent that would be protected from a constitutional challenge.' 7'
A collateral benefit to this scheme is that any tax would be imposed by a
democratically elected legislature, a body politically accountable to votits voice
ers. 172 Thus, if a state's electorate deemed the tax undesirable,
73
process.
political
the
through
vicariously
sound
would
Any of these alternatives would promote the worthwhile organizations that provide legal assistance to those in need without disparaging
the constitutional protections guaranteed private property owners. Thus,
the Brown majority should have abstained from contorting the Fifth
Amendment and its own established precedent in Phillips by categorically proclaiming just compensation for private property taken by states'
IOLTA programs to be zero.174
CONCLUSION

The IOLTA program is commendable because it provides resources
that ultimately reach citizens who are otherwise unable to afford legal
services. The interest taken from IOLTA accounts is often de minimis
from the perspective of the interest's owner. However, because that interest has an owner, the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment must
intervene to ensure the owner is justly compensated for what she has lost.
In Brown, the Supreme Court failed to recognize the need for a factual inquiry into whether an owner of principal actually realized a net
gain in interest to compute just compensation, and thereby missed an
opportunity to fortify the Takings Clause. Instead, the majority focused
on the state-regulated circumstances giving rise to the interest as the basis for the conclusion that the just compensation due the owners is zero.
Following Phillips,an owner's cognizable private property right in
interest generated from principal should stand safely behind the protection of the Takings Clause regardless of the circumstances in which it
was generated. Instead, the new "Robin Hood Taking" principle poses an
ominous threat of uncompensated loss to those who enjoy private property fortuitously created by operation of a state regulation.

170.

Id. at 243 n.2 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

171.

See generally Steven J. Eagle, Regulator' Takings, Public Use, and Just Compensation

After Brown, 33 ENVTL. L. REP. 10807 (2003) (discussing how "the Takings Clause historically has
been regarded as different from the police and taxing powers").
172.
Brown, 538 U.S. at 243 n.2 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
173.

See id.

174.

See id. at 240.
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